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Advocate and Solicitor (Singapore); 
Associate Professor, Faculty of Law, National University of Singapore. 
Introduction 
19.1 Little of significance was decided on the law of restitution in 2004. 
There was nevertheless a smattering of cases dealing with points relevant to 
the principles of the law of restitution, sometimes directly, and sometimes 
indirectly. 
Restitution and risk allocation 
Contract 
19.2 The principle that no restitutionary quantum meruit claim will be 
allowed if such a claim will be inconsistent with the terms of the parties’ 
agreement was re-affirmed in Bayerische Hypo- und Vereinsbank AG v 
C K Tang Ltd [2004] SGHC 254. The defendants had engaged the plaintiff as 
lead manager and underwriter to a proposed securitisation transaction. The 
deal fell through, and the defendant purported to terminate the services of 
the plaintiff under an express term of the contract, and offered to make a 
payment of $275,000 as a goodwill gesture, even though the contract had 
stipulated $165,000 as the break-up fee. The plaintiff treated the termination 
as a repudiatory breach and sued for damages for breach of contract, or, 
alternatively, for reasonable fees of $688,350 for work done, or, alternatively, 
for the break-up fee of $165,000 in addition to or in lieu of damages or the 
reasonable fee for work done. MPH Rubin J held that, on the proper 
construction of the agreement, the defendant was entitled to terminate the 
contract. The judge also dismissed the claim for restitutionary quantum 
meruit on the basis that the contract had expressly provided for the payment 
of a fee upon termination.  
19.3 The court relied on the following quotation from Pavey & Matthews 
Proprietary Ltd v Paul (1987) 162 CLR 221 at 256 (per Deane J): 
Indeed, if there was a valid and enforceable agreement governing the 
claimant’s right to compensation, there would be neither occasion nor legal 
justification for the law to superimpose or impute an obligation or promise 
to pay a reasonable remuneration. The quasi-contractual obligation to pay 
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fair and just compensation for a benefit which has been accepted will only 
arise in a case where there is no applicable genuine agreement or where 
such an agreement is frustrated, avoided or unenforceable. 
19.4 No significance was placed on the fact that the contract had been 
terminated, and certainly, restitutionary actions for failure of consideration 
are generally allowed upon the termination of contracts. However, on the 
facts as found, remuneration for services already rendered upon the 
contingency of the transaction being aborted was a risk that had been 
expressly allocated under the contract through the break-up fee that was 
payable upon the termination of the agreement by the defendant. This case 
illustrates that the courts will not allow a contractual allocation of risk to be 
disturbed by the use of restitutionary actions. 
Company articles of association 
19.5 The related principle of not allowing restitutionary claims to disturb 
the allocation of risks made under statutory law is manifested in the context 
of the articles of association of a company. In Jumabhoy Rafiq v Scotts 
Investments (Singapore) Pte Ltd [2005] 1 SLR 45, the appellant was a director 
of the respondent company. The board of directors had passed resolutions 
which empowered the appellant to perform certain acts on behalf of the 
company, and which also resolved that the respondent would indemnify the 
appellant for “costs and expenses”. The appellant had sued the respondent in 
the High Court for remuneration on a time-cost basis and for 
reimbursement of expenses incurred on behalf of the company. In the 
alternative, the appellant also sued for remuneration in a quantum meruit
action (also on a time-cost basis).  
19.6 The trial court dismissed the appellant’s claims for remuneration, 
but allowed the claim for out-of-pocket expenses incurred on behalf of the 
company. The appellant appealed, and the only dispute in the Court of 
Appeal was whether the appellant was entitled to remuneration. The Court 
of Appeal held that, as a matter of construction, the reference to “costs” in the 
resolutions did not include a reference to remuneration. The restitutionary 
quantum meruit claim was dismissed on the ground that such a claim by a 
director against a company could not be allowed where the articles of 
association of the company had made express provisions for the 
remuneration of directors.  
19.7 The court also approved of Lord Goff of Chieveley’s dictum in 
Guinness Plc v Saunders [1990] 2 AC 663, that in highly exceptional 
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circumstances where doing so would not undermine the law’s objective of 
holding the director to the duty of loyalty to the company, the court may in 
its equitable jurisdiction order the company to grant an allowance to the 
director for services rendered to the company. However, this approval was 
obiter, because, in the view of the Court of Appeal, the facts did not disclose 
any exceptional circumstances. 
19.8 To the extent that this jurisdiction exists, this equitable allowance, 
while it has been seen as the reversal of unjust enrichment by the conferment 
of services, does not fit well into the legal analysis of restitutionary claims. 
Claims to reverse unjust enrichment, and defences to such claims, are based 
on principle and not discretion (Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 2 AC 
548 at 578). The discretionary award of the equitable allowance is based on 
the principle that the beneficiary (in this case, the company) should not be 
allowed to take the benefit of the fiduciary’s efforts without paying for the 
skill and labour that helped to produce such benefit (Guinness Plc v Saunders,
at 701 (Lord Goff)). This is the classic justification for the restitutionary 
quantum meruit claim. One way to rationalise this area of the law, taking the 
analysis of Lord Goff in Guinness Plc v Saunders a step further, may be to 
reconceptualise the nature of the allowance: that the claim in unjust 
enrichment is barred by the general principle that requires the remuneration 
to be made in accordance with the articles of association for the protection of 
the company (or the trust deed in the case of a trustee), but not so barred in 
highly exceptional circumstances where the beneficiary protection principle 
is not threatened. This does, however, require a significant doctrinal shift. 
Payment of another’s debt 
19.9 In Jia Min Building Construction Pte Ltd v Ann Lee Pte Ltd [2004] 
3 SLR 288, V K Rajah JC (as he then was) held that the payment of another’s 
debt without the authority of the debtor could discharge the debt, thereby 
enriching the erstwhile debtor. Although this point arose in a purely 
contractual dispute, the decision could have wider implications for the law of 
restitution. The defendant, the main contractor for a construction project, 
had engaged the plaintiff as a sub-contractor for structural works. In this 
action, the plaintiff was claiming under the contract for sums due for work 
done. One of the issues that arose was whether the defendant could deduct a 
sum representing a payment made directly by the defendant to some foreign 
workers, whom the defendant had procured to work for the plaintiff on an 
agreement with the plaintiff that the plaintiff would be responsible for their 
wages, allegedly without the plaintiff ’s authority or consent. The judge 
adopted the principle stated in B Liggett (Liverpool) Ltd v Barclays Bank Ltd
5 SAL Ann Rev 436 Restitution 439 
[1928] 1 KB 48 (“Liggett’s case) at 59, by Wright J, that: “a person who has in 
fact paid the debts of another without authority is allowed to take advantage 
of his payment”, and held that the only prerequisite was that the payment was 
in discharge of an actual (and not supposed) legal liability of the debtor (at 
[80]).  
19.10 The principle in Liggett’s case itself is a narrow one: An agent who 
without authority debits his principal’s money to pay his principal’s debt is 
subrogated in equity to the right of the principal’s creditor, thereby providing 
an equitable defence to a common law action by the principal against the 
agent. Rajah JC took a broader view of the principle, labelling it as a “general 
equitable principle”, but it is not clear whether this general principle was the 
reason for treating the debt as discharged so that the plaintiff could be said to 
have received a benefit from the payment for the purpose of computing the 
sums due under the contract, or whether, the debt being discharged for other 
reasons, the broad principle then applied to enable the defendant to claim 
the payment as a deductible from the sums due to the plaintiff under the 
contract.  
19.11 The significance of the difference lies in the circumstances under 
which a debt is discharged when payment is not made by the debtor but by a 
third party. On the first interpretation, we need not look for a further reason 
for the discharge of the debt – the payment is reason enough; on the second 
analysis, we need to look for an independent reason for saying that the debt 
is discharged (eg, compulsion, or necessity, or a secondary liability of the 
defendant to pay the debt (Owen v Tate [1976] QB 402), or the payment has 
been adopted by the plaintiff or the plaintiff is estopped from denying the 
adoption of the payment) – otherwise the defendant’s legal recourse is 
against the workers (possibly an action for money had and received for 
mistake or failure of consideration) and not against the plaintiffs.  
19.12 On the basis that the secondment of the workers was on the basis 
that an obligation was incurred by the plaintiff directly to the workers (at 
[5]), there could be (although this is not entirely clear on the facts) a 
secondary obligation on the part of the defendant to pay the workers as their 
direct employer. If so, then the discharge of the debt is clearly explicable on 
the basis of payment of a person with secondary liability on the debt. It is 
therefore suggested that this aspect of the case is too vague to stand for any 
specific proposition of law on the discharge of a debt by the voluntary 
payment of a third party. 
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“At the expense of ” 
19.13 It is axiomatic in an action for the reversal of unjust enrichment that 
it has to be established that the defendant received a benefit at the expense of 
the plaintiff. In most cases, this is a straightforward test. For example, where 
the plaintiff mistakenly pays money to the defendant, it is clear that the 
defendant’s enrichment was at the plaintiff ’s expense: the plaintiff directly 
transferred value to the defendant. The position can be more complicated in 
indirect receipt situations (for this purpose, A paying B to discharge a debt of 
C is a case of direct receipt of a benefit). Generally, unless the plaintiff can 
trace the money paid out, the plaintiff cannot claim against an indirect 
recipient. This requirement for directness of receipt was affirmed by the High 
Court in Sun Fook Kong Construction Ltd v Housing and Development Board
[2004] SGHC 69 (Lai Siu Chiu J in chambers).  
19.14 The plaintiff had entered into certain construction contracts with 
the defendant, and had arranged for a third party to issue security bonds in 
favour of the defendant. The construction contracts were subsequently 
novated, with a wholly-owned subsidiary of the plaintiff taking over the 
plaintiff ’s place. The subsidiary encountered financial difficulties, and the 
defendant called upon the bonds. The third party paid up on the bonds and 
it was reimbursed by the plaintiff. Six years after the payment by the third 
party (after the expiry of any statutory limitation period in respect of any 
claim by the third party against the defendant), the plaintiff sued the 
defendant, alleging the defendant had wrongly called for the payment on the 
bonds.  
19.15 The short answer to the plaintiff ’s claim, as pointed out by Lai J, was 
that it had no standing to sue, as it had fallen out of the picture following the 
novation of the contracts it had made with the defendant, and was not a 
contracting party in respect of other bonds securing the performance of 
contracts entered into by the subsidiary in its own right with the defendant. 
Quite apart from this, the judge observed that the plaintiff ’s claim was in any 
event untenable because “[i]n equity, the principle of restitution is only 
available to the paying party” (at [40]), but the plaintiff was not allowed to 
join the third party as co-plaintiff, partly because the third party was 
unwilling and partly because the third party’s claim would be time-barred 
anyway.  
19.16 As there was very little merit in the plaintiff ’s claim on the reported 
facts, this was not a good case to test principles. But it would seem that, in 
principle, apart from the time bar issue, assuming that the plaintiff ’s claim 
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was based on payment by the third party to the defendant caused by a 
mistake (that the call had been rightly made), and the indemnification of the 
third party by the plaintiff was caused by the same underlying mistake, then 
the plaintiff can subrogate to the restitutionary claim of the third party 
(Kahn v Permayer [2001] BIPR 94). It is not so clear that, outside of the 
context of tracing, in equity only the party who directly pays the defendant 
can claim in restitution, but joinder is clearly necessary. 
Restitution and illegality 
19.17 In Top Ten Entertainment Pte Ltd v Lucky Red Investments Ltd [2004] 
4 SLR 559, the Court of Appeal affirmed the relevance of illegality as a bar to 
a restitutionary claim. After a dispute arose between a tenant and its landlord 
over alleged arrears of rent (this issue will not be discussed in this chapter), 
the tenant claimed against the landlord for overpayment. The tenant alleged 
that the fixing of the rental amount due by the use of two individual 
components, comprising the rental of the premises and hiring charges for use 
of furniture, was intended to deceive revenue authorities, and claimed against 
the landlord for the restitution of the hiring charges paid out, on the basis 
that the tenant was not in pari delicto with the landlord’s illegal venture, and, 
in the alternative, that the amounts had been paid under a mistake of law. 
19.18 The High Court dismissed this claim ([2004] 2 SLR 199), and the 
appeal on this point was dismissed by the Court of Appeal. The Court of 
Appeal held that although the amount apportioned as hiring charges 
appeared to be excessive, the tenancy agreement was not unenforceable for 
illegality as the landlord had disclosed the sums to the revenue authorities 
and the authorities had not been deceived. More significantly, the court held 
that, even if the tenancy agreement had an illegal object, the tenant had not 
made any mistake in making the payments in respect of the hiring charges; 
the tenant was not mistaken as to the amounts payable, and was in fact privy 
to the landlord’s intentions in splitting up the rent. 
19.19 This decision affirms that the mere fact of illegality and the status of 
the plaintiff as not being in pari delicto will not ground a common law 
restitutionary action. The relevance of the illegality lies in barring a 
restitutionary action, and the plaintiff has to point to a basis for the claim for 
restitution. The exceptional situation of an early withdrawal from an illegal 
adventure grounding an independent restitutionary cause of action was not 
applicable to the facts. Thus, the errors, in claiming for restitution based on 
the illegality of the transaction, and based on a mistake in the alternative, 
were corrected in no uncertain terms by the court in looking for – and failing 
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to find – a legal basis for the claim (sometimes called an “unjust factor”) in 
the first place. 
Limitation periods 
19.20 It was assumed in two cases that a common law action for 
restitution of unjust gains was subject to the limitation statute (Limitation 
Act, Cap 163, 1996 Rev Ed). In a previous review ((2002) 3 SAL Ann Rev at 
paras 19.4, 19.42–19.47, it was noted that the Court of Appeal in MCST 
No 473 v De Beers Jewellery Pte Ltd [2002] 2 SLR 1 (“De Beers case”) had 
taken the view that a common law restitutionary claim was based on the 
independent principle of the reversal of unjust gains and hence not a claim 
“founded on contract” (even though it was historically classified as “quasi-
contractual”), so that the limitation statute was not applicable.  
19.21 In Top Ten Entertainment Pte Ltd v Lucky Red Investments Ltd (supra
para 19.17), the assumption was made in respect of a claim for the recovery 
of money paid under a contract allegedly unenforceable for illegality; in Sun 
Fook Kong Construction Ltd v Housing and Development Board (supra
para 19.13), the assumption was made in respect of a claim to recover money 
paid that was allegedly not due under a security bond (presumably on the 
basis of a mistake that it was due, or on a total failure of consideration). In 
both cases there was an underlying contract between the parties in the factual 
matrix (though there was a dispute as to who the relevant party was in the 
second case), so there was consistency with the pre-De Beers case of Ching
Mun Fong v Liu Cho Chit (No 2) [2001] 3 SLR 10 (at [27]–[29]), where the 
claims for the recovery of money paid out on the basis of mistake or failure 
of consideration was subject to the limitation statute where the parties were 
in an underlying contractual relationship, and the claims were founded on 
facts pertinent to that contractual relationship.  
19.22 In Chesworth v Farrar [1967] 1 QB 407, an action for money had 
and received for the proceeds of conversion of chattels (sometimes 
misleadingly called “waiver of tort”) was held to be barred under the 
limitation statute because the claim, although one in “quasi-contract” and 
not contract nor tort, was sufficiently analogous to a claim in contract to be 
considered to be “founded on” contract under the statute. Edmund Davies J 
pointed out that the factual circumstances of the claim (in this case, a 
bailment), whether contractual or otherwise, had no bearing on the legal 
basis of the claim made against the defendant for the purpose of determining 
whether the claim was caught by the provisions of the limitation statute. In 
Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln City Council [1999] 2 AC 349, the common law 
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action for money had and received to recover money paid under a mistake of 
law was assumed to be “founded on simple contract” for the purpose of 
limitation law (at 388, 401–402), a view traceable to In re Diplock [1948] 
Ch 465 at 514. 
19.23 Apart from a review of the limitation statute to consider the place of 
claims founded on the principle against unjust enrichment, there are two 
possible routes that the law of Singapore can take. Firstly, the status quo 
could carry on. A common law restitutionary claim would be caught by the 
limitation statute if the factual foundations of the claim include some 
contractual element, but not otherwise. It is not clear whether this is a 
correct interpretation of a claim to be “founded on contract”, but assuming it 
is correct, it is unsatisfactory that distinctions have to be drawn between a 
case where a contract is void (Kleinwort Benson v Lincoln City Council (supra
para 19.22)) and where the contract’s existence is denied (De Beers case 
(supra para 19.20)). The limitation period would presumably not apply to 
restitutionary claims arising out of negotiations that failed to produce a 
contract, but could apply where the negotiations produced a contract that is 
void. It is not clear what the sense is in these distinctions. Moreover, it is not 
clear that the limitation provision should be confined to claims in restitution
having a factual foundation on the facts of an underlying contract. Moreover, 
on this view, a lacuna is left in the limitation law, and although the Court of 
Appeal has taken the view that it may be plugged with the equitable doctrine 
of laches, this approach is not without difficulties (see (2002) 3 SAL Ann Rev 
at paras 19.42–19.47). 
19.24 Secondly, it could be accepted that, while the juristic foundation of 
the common law restitutionary claims lies in the independent principle of 
the reversal of unjust gains, which is legally separate from contract and tort 
as a matter of common law, nevertheless the statutory intention in the 
limitation statute must be taken to comprehend such actions within the 
claims founded on contract, because the thinking at the time of drafting 
ought to be taken into consideration, and the independence of the principle 
against unjust enrichment was not officially recognised as part of English law 
by the House of Lords until 1991 in Lipkin Gorman v Karpnale Ltd [1991] 
2 AC 548. This would, however, involve a departure from the view adopted by 
the Singapore Court of Appeal in De Beers case.  
19.25 Where legislation has indeed been updated to keep up with the 
changes in common law thinking, there is strong justification in taking the 
(now) logical view that unjust enrichment claims are not founded on 
contract. An example of this can be found in the context of O 11 of the Rules 
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of Court (Cap 322, R 5, 2004 Rev Ed) providing for leave of court for service 
of originating process out of the jurisdiction. Because a specific head has 
been introduced to deal with restitutionary claims (O 11 r 1(o)), there is no 
longer a compelling case to treat such actions as “contractual” (O 11 r 1(d))
for service out of jurisdiction; before the amendment, there was every reason 
to do so. Conversely, where legislation has not caught up with the changes in 
the common law conceptualisations of its causes of action, it is arguable that 
the modern view of the independence of unjust enrichment claims from 
contract should not be so strictly applied. The Limitation Act provides one 
context. Another context is the statutory jurisdiction of the subordinate 
courts of Singapore (Subordinate Courts Act (Cap 321, 1999 Rev Ed), s 20). 
19.26 Neither approach to limitation periods would, however, address the 
problem of the absence of a long-stop limitation period in a case of a claim 
for the recovery of money paid under a mistake of law a very long time ago 
but where the mistake has only just been “discovered” (using reasonable 
diligence) and where no other relevant defences, eg, the settled law defence, 
can apply (for a survey of the defences, see (2002) 3 SAL Ann Rev at 
paras 19.13–19.47), short of the invocation of equitable laches. It may be 
argued that, putting the problem of fusion fallacy to one side, it would be 
easier to justify the application of laches in a case where the limitation statute 
does not apply than in a case where a limitation provision applies and the 
common law claim is still within time. But it is suggested that this distinction 
is quite illusory: there is no limitation under the common law, and in both 
cases, the limitation statute is saying the common law action is not barred in 
the circumstances. 
